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Abstract
This study examines the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and risk
of stock price crash in UK firms. We use CEO Pay Slice (CPS) – the fraction of maximum
top-five executives’ total compensation that goes to the CEO, and board ‘busyness’ – the
proportion of board level directors who have three or more directorships , to evaluate the
effect of these two important aspects of corporate governance on stock price crash risk. The
CPS reflects relative importance of the CEO as well as the extent to which the CEO is able to
extract rents and expropriate shareholders wealth (expropriation effect). Board busyness may
create a serious agency problem because directors are “too busy to mind the business”,
allowing for executives’ short-termism and bad news hoarding (busyness effect). Using a
large sample of UK listed companies over the 1997 to 2010 period, we document evidence
supporting a positive relationship between CPS, board busyness and stock price crash risk. In
line with the expropriation and busyness effects, we find that companies with high CPS and
high levels of board busyness are exposed to higher level of stock price crash risk. The fact
that CPS positively impacts on stock price crash risk has a strong implication for the ongoing debate on how to reform executive remuneration so that it provides the right incentives
to directors. There is also a direct implication for the public debate on limitation of the
number of directorships held by executives from our findings, as we argue that board
effectiveness depends on the overall level of board business.

JEL classification: G32, G35, G38, J33, L29
Key words: CEO compensation, CEO pay slice, busy board, corporate governance, agency
problem, stock price crash risk
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Introduction
The finance literature has long examined corporate governance characteristics. Within the
rapidly developing research on corporate governance, a significant proportion of the relevant
theoretical and empirical literature has concentrated on studying

the relationship between

governance characteristics and stock price crash risk that is of key importance to many
managers, investors, and academics. Changes in regulations, asset expropriation, disruptive
product innovations, market crashes can all provoke stock price crashes. Increases in stock
price crash risk can result in the decline of expected cash flows and NPVs. When cash flows
fall below investors’ expectations, managers tend to hide the bad news in order to protect
their own wealth, human capital, and jobs (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Holmstrom, 1999;
Benmelegh et al., 2010; Gormley and Matsa, 2011). Once negative firm-specific information
becomes generally realized, stock price drops dramatically (Jin and Myers, 2006), increasing
stock price crash risk. A considerable body of literature suggests that corporate governance
mechanisms can help to prevent suboptimal managerial behaviors and so significantly reduce
the risk of the firm’s stock price crashing. Still, evidence on the impact of corporate
governance characteristics on stock price crash risk outside the US is limited.
In this study, we attempt to throw additional light on the links between corporate
governance characteristics and stock price crashes in the UK. In particular, we investigate
whether pay inequality between a company’s CEO and the other top executives, as well as
board ‘busyness’ affect stock price crash risk of British companies. We define pay inequality
as the proportion of top executives’ total compensation that goes to the CEO – which has
been labeled the CEO Pay Slice (CPS); and we measure corporate board busyness by the
2

proportion of busy directors (directors with three or more directorships) represented at the
board level. Our main hypothesis is that companies with high CPS and ‘busy’ boards (which
are both characteristics of weak corporate governance) are more exposed to stock price crash
risk, all else equal. Explanations of positive relationship between CPS, board busyness and
stock price crash risk conform to one of the following theoretical frames. First, high CPS may
be an indication of CEO centrality. Powerful CEO can influence decision making process
within the board room according to his/her own managerial style and risk preferences. CEO
managerial style (whether conservative or aggressive) has been shown to influence important
corporate decisions (Malmendier et al., 2011). CPS, as a measure of CEO power connected
directly to stock price crash risk emerging from the implementation of certain corporate
policies. Second, high-powered compensation packages, combined with information
asymmetry, in the situations where boards are busy, magnify agency problems, and can also
incentivize CEO and top executives to take on decisions that may enhance short term
performance and so increase exposure to the stock price crash risk. Third, due to information
asymmetry, it is difficult for outsiders to differentiate between managerial actions that
generate true positive returns from those that generate high returns in order to help managers
to camouflage the real situation in their companies and protect their jobs, at least for some
time. Therefore, carefully considered structures of CEO and top executives’ compensation
packages, coupled with low pay disparity between top executive team members and good
quality monitoring from non-busy corporate board may be necessary to control stock price
crash risk exposures.
The recent corporate scandals around “fat cats” compensation packages in Britain1 are a
timely reminder that this problem requires further attention. Executive pay has become a
major issue in recent years in the UK, with shareholders questioning high salaries directors
1

See BBC News-Business: “High Pay of UK executives corrosive, report says”, 22 November 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-15827683
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receive2,3. The British government has been very proactive in tackling compensation-related
problems. Thus, in 2002, the UK became the first country to mandate an annual non-binding
shareholder vote on directors’ remuneration (“say on pay”) to improve the “accountability,
transparency, and performance linkage of executive pay” (Baird and Stowasser, 2003). In
September 2013, the government went one step further and introduced mandatory ‘say on
pay’. Shortcomings in regulation of compensation-related issues have been also addressed by
the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 (The Code), with particular attention being paid to
the importance of establishing a strong link between directors’ remuneration and firm
performance4, as well as responsibilities of directors for risk oversight and management 5. In
our analysis we use a large sample of non-financial companies listed on the London Stock
Exchange, comprising 692 firms over the 1997 to 2010 period. We control for important
corporate governance characteristics, such as board composition, board size, CEO- Chairman
duality, and CEO tenure; we also control for various firm-specific characteristics, which are
company size, ratio of capital expenditures to total assets, and leverage. Our empirical
methodology includes the use of panel data and a system GMM estimator. By using this
estimator, we avoid problems associated with unobserved heterogeneity and potential
endogeneity of regressors. The system GMM estimator is also considered as more efficient

2

See The Wall Street Journal – Business: “U.K. Unveils Plan on Executive Pay”, 20 June, 2012, available at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304765304577478172485959522
3
“There is compelling evidence of a disconnect between pay and performance in large UK listed companies”,
UK Business Secretary Vince Cable told Parliament; David Cameron, the UK Prime Minister, also criticised
boardroom cronies who helped each other “fill their boots” while the country was forced to tighten its belt.
"We've got to deal with the merry-go-round where there are too many cases of remuneration committee
members sitting on each other's boards, patting each other's backs and handing out each other's pay rises," he
said. "We need to redefine the word 'fair'. We need to try to give people a sense that we have a vision at the end
of this, of a fairer, better economy, a fairer, better society, where if you work hard and do the right thing you get
rewarded” , 7 January, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/jan/07/david-cameron-fat-cat-pay
4
Section D: Remuneration. Main Principle: “Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract, retain, and
motivate directors of the quality required to run the company successfully, but a company should avoid paying
more than is necessary for this purpose. A significant proportion of executive directors’ remuneration should be
structured so as to link rewards to corporate and individual performance.” (The UK Corporate Governance Code,
June 2010: p.22).
5
Section C2: Risk Management and Internal Control. Main Principle: “The board is responsible for determining
the nature and extent of the significant risks it is willing to take in achieving its strategic objectives. The board
should maintain sound risk management and internal control systems.”
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than other instrumental variable techniques in controlling for the possible endogeneity of
explanatory variables (see Almeida et al., 2010).
Throughout our analysis, we find consistent support for the proposition that higher CPS
and board busyness are associated with higher stock price crash risk. Our results strongly
support the expropriation and busyness arguments6. Thus, a high CPS level could be due to
an agency problem in firms with powerful and influential CEO, who is able to stockpile
negative information from the market for financial (expropriation of rents through the
compensation arrangements)7 or non-financial reasons (e.g., empire building with a view to
expropriating future rents)8. However, upon the realization of this (negative) information by
the market, company’s stock price crashes (Jin and Myers, 2006; Hutton et al., 2009). In
addition, high CPS could demotivate other executive directors, destroy team cooperation
within the boardroom, and lead to poor board and firm performance (the so-called social
comparison effect, which is especially pronounced on the British boards 9 ). In turn, busy
boards are associated with weak corporate governance and also contribute to high agency
problems.10 Therefore, companies with busy corporate boards are likely to experience high
stock price crash risk. Our results indicate that CPS and board busyness can provide a useful
tool for research on stock price crash risk, which is an important issue to be considered in the
UK context.
Our study is related to different streams of the literature. First, extent research shows
that proportion of compensation received by CEOs has been trending up over time (Bebchuk
and Grinstein, 2005; Frydman, 2005, Frydman and Saks, 2010 among others). We add to this

6

See Section 4.2 of this chapter for detailed discussion of theories.
See Kothari et al., 2009.
8
See Ball, 2001.
9
See Zalewska (2014a,b) for detailed discussion of UK board mechanisms and structures.
10
See Gilson (1990); Lipton and Lorsch (1992); National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) (1996);
Beasly (1996); Cotter et al. (1997); Core et al. (1999); Brown and Maloney (1999); Shivdasni and Yermack
(1999); Miwa and Ramseyer (2000); Bohren and Strom (2001); Ferris et al. Pritchard (2003); Fich and
Shivdasani (2006); and Cooper and Uzun (2012).
7
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literature stream by investigating the relationship between CPS and stock price crash risk in
the UK. Second, we contribute by analyzing the association between different corporate
governance characteristics and stock price crash risk. Thus, scholars discuss impact of large
shareholders and institutional investors (An and Zhang, 2013), the opacity of financial reports
(Hutton et al., 2009), and CEO incentives and power (Kim et al., 2011a). We contribute to
this literature by considering other aspects of governance arrangement, the CPS and board
busyness, and their impact on stock price crash risk. Finally, our work enhances the literature
that analyzes different CEO qualities and characteristics and their effect on firm outcomes.
We highlight CPS and board busyness as important features which can provide additional
insight into understanding the link between corporate governance characteristics and stock
price crash risk. This is the first study that we are aware of, highlighting the above mentioned
aspects using the UK-based sample.
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. We provide theoretical background
and develop hypothesis in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 contains the sample description and
summary statistics. Section 4.4 outlines the methodology used for the analysis. Section 4.5
examines the relationship between CPS, board busyness and stock price crash risk. Section
4.6 provides results of additional tests. Section 4.7 concludes.

Related literature and hypothesis development
Corporate Governance and Stock Price Crashes: The Existing Evidence
An extensive body of literature suggests that corporate governance mechanisms can help to
prevent sub-optimal managerial behavior (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Healy et al., 1999).
Good corporate governance practices discipline investments (Masulis et al., 2007), prevent
earnings management (Xie et al., 2003), improve information disclosure process (Armstrong
et al., 2012; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005), and align interests of managers and shareholders
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(Benmelegh et al., 2010 among others). Ironically, the structure of executives’ compensation
- which is supposed to align interests of managers and shareholders - may also trigger agency
problems. Accordingly, Healy (1985), Beneish (1999), Ke (2005), Burns and Kedia (2006),
Johnson et al. (2009), Kedia and Philippon (2010) argue that stock-based compensation leads
to accounting fraud, misreporting, and earnings mismanagement, followed by the stock price
overvaluation and collapse.
Benmelegh et al. (2010) demonstrate that stock-based CEO compensation can cause
stock price crashes. They identify conditions under which stock-based compensation leads to
suboptimal investment, misreporting, and a subsequent sharp decline in equity prices.
Benmelegh et al. (2010) argue that CEOs of medium – to high-growth firms initially have to
invest intensively in order to make a better use of growth opportunities. When growth rates
slow down, CEOs can camouflage growth decline by making suboptimal investment
decisions, resulting in subsequent stock price collapse. Kim et al. (2011b) provide empirical
evidence supporting results of Benmelegh et al. (2010).
An and Zhang (2013) explore the relationship between institutional investors’
ownership and stock price crash risk, and conclude that strong monitoring by dedicated
institutional investors attenuates managers’ bad-news hoarding, and so prevents rapid stock
price drop. Andreou et al. (2013) consider several corporate governance characteristics and
their effects on firm-specific future stock price crashes. They find that future stock price
crashes are positively related to institutional ownership, percentage of directors who hold
company’s shares, and opacity of financial reports. Conversely, the percentage of
independent directors on the audit committee and auditor’s industry experience are negatively
related to stock price crashes.
Gormley et al. (2013) consider unanticipated changes in firm’s business environments,
which lead to increased stock price crash risks. Gormley et al. (2013) examine managers’
7

reaction to increases in business risks as a function of their pre-existing equity-based
incentives. They find that structure of managerial compensation has an important effect on
managerial motivation to induce firm’s level of risk and firm’s response to stock price crash
risks11. These findings are consistent with those in Gormley and Matsa (2011), who argue
that agency conflicts can be mitigated by reducing managers’ exposure to firm risk12.
CEO’s management style can also influence firm risk. Managerial style affects
corporate risk management throughout the impact that personal CEO characteristics have on
vital corporate decisions and policies. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find that all investment,
financing, and other organizational policies depend on specific managerial attributes. They
argue that older managers are more conservative, while managers who hold an MBA degree
are more aggressive. Malmendier et al. (2011) find that CEO’s previous experience and
his/her personal expertise gained over the prior crises (the “Depression baby” effect),
influence companies’ financing and investment policies. Malmendier et al. (2011) also state
that overconfident CEOs believe that all their decisions are value maximizing, and boards
have to use various tools in order to constrain such CEOs. They argue that executives’
compensation packages need to account for the particular managerial style (conservative or
aggressive) arising from managers’ past experience to make financial incentives effective.
Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) investigate the importance of risk control for bank holding
companies (BHC). They hypothesize that company’s risk culture13 determines both the risk
appetite and the strength of the risk management system. Ellul and Yerramilli (2013)
differentiate between risk cultures that follow “business model channel” or “hedging

11

Gormley et al. (2013) recommend that, in designing executives’ compensation packages, boards should
consider the potential changes in companies’ risk environment and how executives will respond given their
compensation levels.
12
Gormley and Matsa (2011) advise that executives’ exposure to firm risk can be reduced if the stock-based
component in their compensation packages is reduced.
13
Kimbrough and Componation (2009) argue that company’s organisational culture plays an important role in
areas such as implementation of new initiatives, its reaction to changes in the market and its ability to navigate
major changes in its business environment.
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channel”14. Conservative (aggressive) companies with “business model channel” culture take
lower (higher) risk and have stronger (weaker) risk management in place; in contrast, under
the “hedging channel” culture, aggressive (conservative) companies undertake high (low) risk
coupled with a strong (weak) risk management. By evaluating companies’ response to
unexpected losses during the 1998 Russian crisis, they find evidence supporting the business
model channel culture, i.e., companies with high tail risk had a weaker risk management
system in place. This result is consistent with findings in Fahlenbrach et al. (2012), who find
that financial institutions which performed worst during the 1998 crisis also demonstrated the
worst performance during the 2007- 2008 crisis.
CPS and Stock price crash risk.
Weak corporate governance can result in CEO-dominated firms (Jiraporn et al., 2005). The
importance of a “dominant player” in corporate decision making cannot be underestimated
(Bebchuk et al., 2011). However, there is a risk that influential CEO can hide problems from
the board (Jiraporn et al., 2005; Walkling, 2010). If board does not have all necessary
information, board becomes less effective and problems are likely to remain hidden until
“revealed by a disaster” (Walkling, 2010: p.17). There is also an exposure to expropriation
risk, which results from rent extractions by dominant CEOs (Walkling, 2010). Rent
extraction by company insiders, including CEOs affects corporate investment, cost of funds,
company growth, and stock returns (see Becht et al., 2003).
To identify CEO dominancy, Bebchuk et al. (2011) use ‘CEO pay slice (CPS)’ - the
proportion of the aggregate salary of top five executive directors that goes to the CEO. High
CPS level signals agency problems in companies with dominant CEO and weak corporate
governance. A powerful and authoritative CEO is able to influence the structure of his/her

14

The latter so called because it is consistent with the main predictions of hedging theories in Smith and Stulz
(1985);and in Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) (see Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013).
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own compensation contract in a way that allows him/her to expropriate rents at the expense
of shareholders (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Jiraporn et al., 2005). Studies by Blanchard et al.
(1994), Yermack (1997) and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) determine that some features
of compensation packages reflect rent-seeking by executives. Jiraporn et al. (2005) investigate the relationship between CEO compensation and corporate governance15, and also
find evidence supporting the rent expropriation argument.
We follow Bebchuk et al. (2011) and interpret a high CPS as a sign of a CEO
centrality. A dominant CEO could influence decision making processes within a board room
according to his/her own managerial style and risk preferences. CEO managerial style
(conservative or aggressive) influences important corporate decisions (Malmendier et al.
2011) and firm performance (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). Hence, CPS might be connected
directly to the stock price crash risk, which emerges as a result of implementation of certain
corporate policies. High CPS magnifies agency problems, and might incentivize a CEO to
take on decisions (e.g., financing, investment and dividend decision) that enable him/her to
extract rents and so expropriate shareholders’ wealth. Thus, for example, a dominant CEO
could prioritize short-term price maximization to secure his/her own private benefits, and
hide true information from the board of directors, so increasing company’s exposure to stock
price crash risk. These arguments lead us to the following (expropriation) hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: CPS is positively associated with stock price crash risk.
Busy Boards and Stock price crash risk
The agency theory literature suggests that directors who overstretch themselves and accept
additional seats on more boards due to the associated extra personal perquisites, tend to
spend less time on each individual board, so compromising their responsibilities and

15

Jiraporn et al. (2005) use shareholder rights as a measure of the corporate governance standard.
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neglecting their duties (Ferris et al., 2003)16. Holding multiple directorships might negatively
affect monitoring and advisory capacity of the board. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) and
Core et al. (1999) argue that directors with multiple seats “cater for CEOs”, and that multiple
board appointments correlate with excess CEO compensation, implying that such directors
serve an inadequate check on management. Busy directors have a higher propensity to be
absent from board meetings neglecting their duties by not taking part in the strategic
decisions-making processes (Jiraporn et al., 2008). Beasly (1996) provides evidence that the
number of board seats held by supervisory directors exhibits positive correlation with
accounting fraud, and points to the lack of attention from these directors. Busy directors tend
to take care of their own reputation and to leave underperforming companies, suggesting that
the presence of overstretched directors may be endogenous to firm performance (Brown and
Maloney, 1999; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006).
Despite the fact that busy directors are proficient and knowledgeable in their field,
they are not able to use these skills to their full advantage, because their multiple
responsibilities can create high levels of distraction. Cooper and Uzun (2012) find that
directors who are less distracted in terms of other directorships and high-level corporate
responsibilities tend to monitor banks better. Banks with less busy directors are less risky
than banks with busy directors. Christy et al. (2009) also examine the links between corporate
governance and equity risk, focusing on the board of directors, and find a negative
relationship between the market risk of equity and multiple directorships held by independent
board members.
Information asymmetry 17 might be especially pronounced in the presence of busy

16

See also Gilson (1990); Lipton and Lorsch (1992); National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD)
(1996); Beasly (1996); Cotter, Shivdasani and Zenner (1997); Core et al.(1999); Brown and Maloney (1999);
Shivdasni and Yermack (1999); Miwa and Ramseyer (2000); Bohren and Strom (2001); Ferris et al. (2003);
Fich and Shivdasani (2006); Cooper and Uzun (2012) who challenge the wisdom of holding too many
directorships by examining busy boards’ effectiveness.
17
By hiding bad information from shareholders and prospective investors, CEO magnifies information
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boards, due to the inability of busy directors to provide thorough monitoring and to identify
problems in a timely manner. Busy boards with overcommitted directors could result in
severe agency problems, due to poor monitoring. This might result in CEO’s and top
executives’ short-termism and might increase company’s exposure to stock price crash risk.
A CEO with a busy board might be incentivized to camouflage real situation in the company
in order to protect himself/herself from job loss and to secure private benefits, at least for a
time. However, upon the release of negative firm-specific information, company faces a
shock, which leads to the increase in its stock price crash risk. Considering the above
arguments and results from previous research, we hypothesize that in the presence of busy
boards, firms are more exposed to the stock price crash risk and propose the following
(busyness) hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Busy boards are positively associated with stock price crash risk.

1.0

The effect of industry competition and financial crisis on the relationship between
CPS, board busyness and stock price crash risk
Giroud and Mueller (2010) argue that effect of corporate governance on agency

problem depends on industry competition. When competition is high, ‘bad’ managers are
penalized by the market and the importance of the monitoring element of corporate
governance is reduced.
Johnson et al. (2000), Mitton (2002), and Lemmon and Lins (2003) among others,
advise that stock prices of companies with weak corporate governance drop more when the
economy contracts because the extraction of private benefits by executives may be greater
during recessions, when the expected rate of return on investment falls. Companies with
higher CPS and busier boards might be exposed to higher stock price crash risk during

asymmetry.
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periods of market instability.
Considering the above arguments, we hypothesize that effect of CPS and board
busyness on stock price crash risk might be stronger in the industries with low competition
and especially pronounced when markets are turbulent.
Hypothesis 3a: The impact of CPS and board busyness on stock price crash risk is
stronger in industries with lower level of competition.
Hypothesis 3b: The effect of CPS and board busyness on stock price crash risk is
more pronounced during the recession periods.

Sample Selection and Data Description
The Sample
We use a large sample of non-financial companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. We
collect firms’ financial and market information from the Thompson Datastream, whereas
corporate governance and directors’ compensation information is from the BoardEx database.
The sample period is from 1997 to 2010 and includes all firms whose information is available
from these two sources.
The BoardEx database consists of directors’ information, including name, role title
and description, indication of whether director is executive or supervisory director, the
number of years each director served on the board and in his/her current role, director’s total,
cash/direct and equity compensation, and the number of quoted companies’ boards on which
each director currently sits. From this database, we obtain data for non-financial firms for
which there is information available for at least two executive board members and a company
has a CEO.
We collect accounting and stock market data necessary to calculate risk measures and
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to control for firm characteristics from the Thompson Datastream, including weekly prices,18
book value of assets, market value of equity, and value of total debt at the end of each year.
We merge data from BoardEx and Datastream, and select companies with at least five
consecutive years of data19. After all, we have an unbalanced panel of 692 firms over the
1997 – 2010 time period.
Variable definition
We use three proxies for stock price crash risk in our study: Tail Risk, Negative
Conditional Skewness, and Extreme Sigma. We follow Andreou et al. (2013), and Ellul and
Yerramilli (2013) in our definitions of crash risk proxies. Our first measure is Tail Risk. In a
given year Tail Risk is defined as the negative of the average return on the company’s stock
over the 5% of its worst return weeks (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013).
Our second measure is the Extreme Sigma. It is defined as a negative of the worst
deviation of firm-specific weekly returns from the average firm-specific weekly returns
divided by the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns (see Andreou et al., 2013).
For a given firm i in a year t, the extreme sigma is computed as:
𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑅_𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑇 = −𝑀𝑖𝑛 [

̅ 𝑖,𝑇
𝑊𝑖,𝑡 −𝑊
𝜎𝑊𝑖,𝑇

]

(7)

̅𝑖,𝑡 is the average firm-specific weekly
Where 𝑊𝑖,𝑡 is the firm-specific weekly return; 𝑊
return in the fiscal year, and 𝜎𝑊𝑖,𝑇 is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns.
The firm-specific weekly return for firm i in the week t defined as Wi,t= ln(1+εi,t), where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
represents the residuals from the expanded index model regression (8):
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1,𝑖 𝑟𝑚,𝑡−2 + 𝛽2,𝑖 𝑟𝑚,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,𝑖 𝑟𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽4,𝑖 𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1 + 𝛽5,𝑖 𝑟𝑚,𝑡+2 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

(8)

Where ri,t is the return on stock i in the week t, and rm,t is the return on the FTSE Allshare index in the week t. We follow Andreou et al. (2013) and include lead and lag variables
18
19

We use weekly prices for the computation of our risk proxies.
We use system GMM estimator for our analysis, which requires having at least five consecutive years of data.
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for the market index in a regression which separates market-wide return movements from
firm returns, so that residuals capture weekly firm-specific returns.
The third measure is the Negative conditional skewness (NCSKEW). Following Kim
(2011a, 2011b), An and Zhang (2013) and Andreou (2013) we calculate NCSKEW by taking
the negative of the third central moment of firm-specific deviations of weekly returns from
the company’s annual mean return, scaled by the sample variance of firm-specific weekly
return raised to the power of 3/2. Specifically, we compute NCSKEW for the firm i in fiscal
year t as:
3

𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝐼,𝑇 = −

3

̅
[𝑛(𝑛−1)2 ∑𝑛
𝑇=1(𝑊𝑖,𝑡 −𝑊𝑖,𝑇 ) ]
3
2 2

(9)

̅
[(𝑛−1)(𝑛−2)(∑𝑛
𝑇=1(𝑊𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑊𝑖,𝑇 ) ) ]

̅𝑖,𝑇 is the average firm-specific weekly
where 𝑊𝑖,𝑡 is the firm-specific weekly return, 𝑊
return in the fiscal year, and n is the number of observations in the year t.
Scaling the raw third moment by cubed standard deviation is a standard normalization
employed for skewness in statistics that allows for a comparison across returns with different
variances. We follow the literature by putting a minus sign in front of the skewness so that an
increase in NCSKEW corresponds to more crash risk, i.e., a more negatively-skewed stock
return distribution.
Our definition of CPS is marginally different from that in Bebchuk et al. (2011). We
compute CPS as a fraction of the total compensation of a group of top executives (minimum
two and maximum five), that is received by the CEO20. We follow Ferris et al. (2003) in our
definition of busy boards, and consider directors busy if they have seats on boards of three or
more listed companies. We control for other influences on crash risk, found to be important
in the previous studies (see Andreou et al., 2013; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013 among others),

20

British corporate boards are, on average smaller than American boards. Only 16% of our sample companies
have five or more executive directors at the board level.
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and include firm size, capital expenditures, and leverage in our models. We also collect
information about each firm’s governance structure, such as board size, board composition,
CEO tenure, CEO duality, whether the CEO is insider or outsider (i.e. was/was not a firm
employee before being appointed to the CEO position). Variable definitions are provided in
Table 4.1. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 give sample calculation examples for CPS and Board Busyness.
***Insert Tables 1, 2, and 3 here***

Summary Statistics
Summary statistics are reported in Table 4.421. We separate our data into variables describing
crash risk (Panel A); compensation, director characteristics and board structure (Panel B);
and firm characteristics (Panel C). The mean value of Tail Risk is 0.14, and of Negative
Conditional Skewness, and Extreme Sigma are 0.12 and 2.88 respectively, which are in line
with those reported in Andreou et al. (2013), Kim et al. (2011a) and Bradshaw et al. (2011).
The average CEO pay slice (CPS) based on the total compensation of up to top five
executives( including CEO) is 44.98% (minimum 0%, maximum 100%). The average board
busyness is 17.11%, i.e. 17.11% of directors held seats on least two other boards at the same
time. There are some companies that do not have busy directors at all and some with 66.67%
busy directors at the board level. The average board in our sample has 7 directors. The
average proportion of executive directors at the board level (Board Composition) was 47.89%
with a minimum of 20% and a maximum 80% of executives represented at the board. The
average CEO tenure is 5.16 years in our sample companies, with minimum 0 and maximum
24.70 years. 53.82% of the companies in our sample have CEOs, who had not previously
been company employees (Outside CEO). 9% of our sample companies have CEOs who
chair the board at the same time.
21

All variables are winzorized to the 1st /99th percentiles.
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Firm size is, on average 4.65. Leverage level in the average company is 17.72%, with
maximum leverage equals to 95%, and minimum leverage equals to 0%. The maximum
(minimum) ratio of capital expenditures to total assets is 0.34 (0), with the average being
equal to 0.05.
*******Insert Table 4*******

Research design
We use a dynamic generalized method of moments (GMM)22 estimator in our analysis. The
GMM estimator has the following advantages: (1) it allows to include firm fixed effects to
account for the firm’s unobserved heterogeneity; (2) it considers the impact of previous stock
price crashes on the current state of corporate governance in a firm; (3) it accounts for
simultaneity by using a combination of variables from a firm’s history as valid instruments
(Wintoki et al., 2012).
We estimate the effect of governance characteristics on risk, conditional on firm
heterogeneity, by using the following empirical model23:
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑𝑠 𝑘𝑠 𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑠 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖

s=1,…, p,

(1)

Where vectors X, Z, and y are corporate governance, firm and risk characteristics,
respectively; 𝛽 captures the effect of governance on firm’s risk; η is an unobserved firm
effect, and 𝜖𝑖 is a random error term.
The estimation procedure involves two important steps. First, we take the first
differences of (1):
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑘𝑝 ∑𝑝 ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑝 + 𝛽∆𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾∆𝑍𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝜖𝑖𝑡 , 𝑝 > 0

(2)

and eliminate all unobserved time invariant heterogeneity. We use GMM to estimate (2), and
22

The dynamic panel GMM estimator, which was developed in Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988); Arellano and Bond
(1991); Arellano and Bover (1995); and Blundell and Bond (1998), improves on ordinary least squares estimates
(OLS) and fixed effects estimates.
23
We follow Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) and Wintoki et al. (2012) in this approach.
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use lagged values of stock price crash risk, corporate governance and firm-specific variables
as instruments for these variables. There are two important criteria defining the validity of
these instruments: first, they must provide a source of variation for current governance, i.e.,
𝑋𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑦𝑡−𝑘 , 𝑋𝑡−𝑘 , 𝑍𝑡−𝑘 ), where k>p, and X, Z, and y are corporate governance, firm,
and risk characteristics, respectively. Second, lagged values must be exogenous in order to be
valid instruments. For the exogeniety assumptions to be valid, we need the following
orthogonality conditions to hold:
𝐸(𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑠 𝜖𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝐸(𝑍𝑖𝑡−𝑠 𝜖𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑠 𝜖𝑖𝑡 ) = 0, ∀𝑠 > 𝑝

(3)

We can then estimate (2) using GMM and considering orthogonality conditions (3). However,
there are econometric shortcomings associated with this procedure. First, “if [the] original
model is conceptually in levels” (Wintoki, 2012: p.588), differencing will reduce the
variation in the explanatory variables and consequently, the power of the tests (Beck et al..
2000). Second, variables in levels may be weak instruments for first-differenced equations
(Arrelano and Bover, 1995). Third, first differencing may worsen the impact of measurement
errors on the dependent variables (Griliches and Hausman, 1986).
Arrelano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) argue that it is possible to
mitigate these shortcomings and improve the GMM estimator by including the equations in
levels in the estimation procedure. It is then possible to use first-differenced variables as
instruments for the equations in levels in a “stacked” system of equations that includes
equations in both levels and differences, resulting in a system GMM estimator that involves
estimating the following system:
𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑝
𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑋
𝑍
[∆𝑦 ] = 𝛼 + 𝑘 [∆𝑦
] + 𝛽 [ 𝑖𝑡 ] + 𝛾 [ 𝑖𝑡 ] + 𝜖𝑖𝑡
∆𝑋𝑖𝑡
∆𝑍𝑖𝑡
𝑖𝑡
𝑖𝑡−𝑝

(4)

To deal with unobserved heterogeneity in level equation, we make a reasonable
assumption that correlation between governance/firm characteristics and unobserved effects
(such as, for example managerial ability, managerial productivity, etc.) will be constant over
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time. This assumption requires additional orthogonality conditions:
𝐸[∆𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑠 (𝜂𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 )] = 𝐸[∆𝑍𝑖𝑡−𝑠 (𝜂𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 )] = 𝐸[∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑠 (𝜂𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 )] = 0, ∀𝑠 > 𝑝

(5)

We carry out GMM panel estimation considering the orthogonality conditions of (3)
and (5), and assume no serial correlation in the error term, ϵ. The orthogonality conditions
imply that we can use lagged levels as instruments for the differenced equations and lagged
differences as instruments for the level equations, respectively.
To verify a key exogeniety assumption that the firm’s historical risk and
characteristics are exogenous with respect to current shocks or innovations in risk, we also
test for the second-order serial correlation 24 and over-identification 25 , as suggested by
Arellano and Bond (1991).
As a potential concern with our analysis could be that the relationship between corporate
governance and stock price crash risk is dynamically endogenous, i.e. that company’s past
stock price crash risk determines both current corporate governance arrangements and current
risk (see Wintoki et al.(2012) and Ellul and Erramilli (2013)). We follow Ellul and Erramilli
(2013), and address this concern by analyzing a relationship between corporate governance
and stock price crash risk using a dynamic panel GMM estimator in the following form:
𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡
14

+ 𝛽10 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡 + 𝜀 𝑖𝑡

(𝟔)

𝑗=2

Where Crash Risk is one of our three proxies for the stock price crash risk defined as Tail
Risk, Negative Conditional Skewness, and Extreme Sigma. All variable definitions are
24

For the GMM estimates, if the assumptions of the specification are valid, by construction the residuals in first
differences (AR(1)) should be correlated, but there should be no serial correlation in second differences (AR(2)).
25
Multiple lags are used as instruments in the dynamic panel GMM model. Hence, the system is over-identified
and test of over-identification has to be carried out. The Hansen test provides a J-statistic, which is distributed as
χ2 under the null hypothesis of the validity of instruments.
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provided in Table 4.1.

Results
In this section we discuss our empirical results concerning the association between corporate
governance characteristics such as CPS and board busyness and Crash Risk, measured by
three different proxies, i.e., Tail Risk, Negative Conditional Skewness, and Extreme Sigma.
Our models include the standard controls used in the literature. Thus, we control for firm size
(log of firm’s market value), firm capital expenditures and leverage; we also control for the
board size, board composition, CEO-Chairman duality, CEO tenure, whether the CEO is
insider (i.e., was a company employee before being appointed CEO) or outsider, and year
dummy. We run few tests to check for the potential misspecification of our estimation model.
First, we use the Hansen J statistics of overidentification restrictions to check for the validity
of our chosen instruments and, second, we use m2 statistics, developed by Arellano and Bond
(1991) to test for the lack of second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals,
and find no such problem in our model.
The results are displayed in Table 4.5, and provide consistent evidence that corporate
governance mechanisms are significantly associated with stock price crashes. Specifically,
we find that coefficients on CPS are positive and statistically significant (at the 1% level) in
all our models, indicating that stock price crash risk is higher when CPS is high. High CPS
magnifies the agency problem, and is a form of rent extraction by a dominant CEO. It might
incentivize a CEO to prioritize short-term goals in order to secure his/her own private
benefits and expropriate wealth from shareholders. In addition, a CEO can hide problems
from the board for some time until bad news is “revealed by disaster” (Walkling, 2010: p.17).
CEO’s short-termism combined with bad news hoarding, increases company’s exposure to
stock price crash risk. These results support the Expropriation Hypothesis (H1), and are in
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line with results from existing theoretical and empirical literature (see Jiraporn et al., 2005;
Ellul and Yerramilli, 2010; and Andreou et al., 2013 among others). There is also strong
evidence that board busyness is positively related to stock price crashes. Multiple
responsibilities of busy directors create a high level of distraction. Information asymmetry is
especially pronounced in the presence of busy boards due to inability of busy directors to
perform comprehensive monitoring and to identify problems. As a result, a company’s
exposure to stock price crash risk increases. The coefficients on board busyness are positive
and statistically significant (at the 1% level) supporting the Busyness Hypothesis (H2), and
consistent with the view that companies with busy directors are more at risk of their stock
price crashing (Cooper and Uzun, 2012; Christy et al., 2009).
Moving to control variables included in the regressions, we find some interesting
results. Board Composition, our measure of board independence, has negative and
statistically significant (at 1% and 5% levels) coefficients. These results support the view
that higher level of board independence is beneficial to the company, i.e., companies with
such boards face lower Stock price crash risk. Board size has positive and statistically
significant (at the 1% level) coefficients, supporting the view that small boards are more
efficient and perform better than their larger counterparts when it comes to managing
company risks. CEO tenure is positive and statistically significant (at 1% and 5% levels) in
all models, indicating that CEOs with longer tenure may be entrenched, and more likely to
use their power to camouflage bad news, enhancing companies’ Stock price crash risk. We
find a negative relationship between the CEO - Chairman Duality and our proxies for the
stock price crash risk. CEO-Chairman duality results in a higher level of power concentration
in hands of one person, who can influence a board of directors. The reason for the negative
relation between duality and stock price crash risk could be that such duality will result in
better CEO knowledge and expertise, and might affect his/her level of risk aversion. More
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powerful CEOs may be more likely to protect the company and themselves from future
possible financial inconveniences and make relatively safe investments, associated with
lower risk levels. Our results reveal a negative relation between Outside CEOs and firms’
crash risk. To protect their own reputational capital, outside CEOs may avoid opportunistic
behavior and bad news hoarding, so minimizing stock price crash risk.
We also find firm Size (measured as natural logarithm of market value of equity) is
negatively related to stock price crash risk with all coefficients being statistically significant
at the 1% level. The reason for this negative relation might be that larger firms are more
stable and less exposed to such a risk. Our analysis also reveals that leverage and capital
expenditures positively affect crash risk. These results are in line with our expectations and
are in agreement with findings from previous literature (see Kim et al., 2011a, An and Zhang,
2013).
***Insert Table 5 here***

Further tests
Effect of industry competition on the stock price crashes
In accordance with agency theory, effective corporate governance helps to alleviate
managerial opportunism by reducing the information asymmetry that exists between
managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Effect of corporate governance on
agency problem depends on industry competition (Giroud and Mueller, 2010). When
competition is high, ‘bad’ managers are penalized by the market and the importance of the
monitoring element of corporate governance is reduced. We follow Andreou et al. (2013) and
measure industry competition by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI is
calculated as the sum of squared market shares as follow:
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𝑁𝐽
2
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑖=1

Where Si,j,t is the market share of firm i in industry j in year t. Market share is
calculated using firm sales. We estimate industry competition for each of the 15 FTAG3
industry classifications. High values of HHI values indicate weaker industry competition.
We split our sample in two groups, high and low competition, based on the value of
HHI at year t-1 (HHI value lower than the median identifies the high competition group, and
HHI value higher than the median identifies the low competition group). We re-estimate our
baseline models from Table 4.5 for the two subsamples separately to identify the impact of
corporate governance on stock price crashes in the different regimes. The results are shown in
Table 4.6. The results are consistent with the results from the baseline models from Table 4.5.
However, we find that the influence of corporate governance on stock price crashes is
stronger in industries with low competition. These findings are in line with findings of Giroid
and Mueller (2010), who stress on the importance of effective corporate governance for
companies in industries where competition is low.
***Insert Table 6 here***
The effect of corporate governance characteristics during the 2007-08 financial crisis
Johnson et al. (2000); Mitton (2002); and Lemmon and Lins (2003) among others, argue that
stock prices of companies with weak corporate governance drop more when economy
contracts. This is due to the extraction of private benefits by executives, which may be
greater during recessions, when the expected rate of return on investment falls. We
investigate the effect of corporate governance on stock price crashes during the recent
financial crisis. We follow An and Zhang (2013) in identify years 2007 and 2008 as the crisis
years. We use a dummy variable for the crisis years, and include it in our baseline model
from Table 4.5. We also check whether CPS and board busyness have more pronounced
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effects on the stock price crashes during these years by including the interaction variables,
CPS x Crisis and Board_Busyness x Crisis. The results are represented in Table 4.7.
When Tail Risk is used as a proxy for the stock price crash, the Crisis variable is
positive and statistically significant (at the 1% level), indicating the increased stock price
crash risk of firms during the financial crisis. Other variables of interest are the interaction
variables CPS x Crisis and Board_Busyness x Crisis. The impact of CPS during the crisis
becomes negative and statistically significant when Tail risk is used as a measure of stock
price crash. A plausible explanation is that high CPS motivates CEO to perform better during
turbulent periods, i.e., if CEO with high CPS can manage to reduce stock price crash risk
during the crisis years, he/she continues to enjoy career benefits in form of high CPS.
However, Board_Busyness x Crisis is not significant at the conventional level, which
suggests that the association between board busyness and stock price crash risk is not
significantly different during the financial crisis. When Negative Conditional skewness is
used as a proxy for stock price crash risk, the Crisis variable is also positive and statistically
significant (at the 10% level) indicating that stock price crash during the financial crisis
increases. The impact of CPS during the crisis becomes negative, but is not statistically
significant, while Board_Busyness x Crisis is positive and significant (at the 1% level),
suggesting that firms with busy boards were more exposed to stock price crash risk during the
crisis years. When Extreme Sigma is used as a proxy for stock price crash risk, the impact of
CPS during the crisis becomes negative but is not statistically significant. Board_Busyness x
Crisis is also positive and significant (at the 5% level), which suggests that firms with busy
boards face higher stock price crash risks during the crisis years. Overall, the results from
Table 4.7 provide some indication that the financial crisis affects stock price crash risks in a
positive way. The results are also suggest that during the crisis years, CPS could have a
negative impact on stock price crash risk of firms; whereas, board busyness affects stock

24

price crash risk in a positive way.
***Insert Table 7 here***

Conclusion
We investigate how governance characteristics affect firms’ risk of experiencing a stock price
crash. In our analysis, we use governance variables that capture board busyness and so-called
CEO centrality. We use CEO pay slice (CPS) as a proxy for the CEO centrality and estimate
board busyness as a proportion of busy directors on a firm’s board. We offer new insights by
evaluating the role of CPS and Board Busyness on the stock price crash risk by analyzing
Expropriation and Busyness Hypotheses.
High CPS magnifies agency problems and might incentivize a CEO to take on
decisions that enable to extract rents and expropriate shareholder wealth. A dominant CEO
could prioritize short-term price maximization to secure his/her own private benefits and hide
true information from the board of directors increasing company’s exposure to stock price
crash risks. In turn, busy boards with overcommitted directors could result in the severe
agency problem; they (busy boards) might be unable to monitor management effectively.
Weak corporate boards encourage CEO’s opportunistic behaviors and short-termism and
company’s exposure to stock price crash risks increase.
Our analysis reveals a positive association between CPS, board busyness and stock
price crash risk. Companies with high CPS and busy boards tend to be more exposed to stock
price crash risks. The results of our study are robust when controlling for various firm, board
and CEO characteristics, including board composition, board size, CEO/Chairman duality,
CEO tenure and whether CEO was previously a company employee, as well as firm size,
value of capital expenditures, and leverage; and to different regime specifications, including
different levels of industry competition. Our findings are in line with findings in Andreou et

25

al. (2013), An and Zhang (2013), and Ellul and Yerramilli (2013). However, this is the first
study that we are aware of which investigates the governance – stock price crash risk
relationship using the UK-based sample.
Motivated by the changes in remuneration practices introduced by the UK Corporate
Governance Code (2010) and the “say on pay” law (2013), we find that CPS is an important
aspect of firm governance and management, that deserves attention of both researches and
policy makers. The fact that CPS positively impacts on stock price crash risk has a strong
implication for the on-going debate about how to reform executive remuneration so that it
provides the right incentives. Our findings highlight the importance of considering
remuneration issues at the board, rather than just at the CEO level, and support The UK
Corporate Governance Code (2010) principles 26. Even if a CEO compensation package is
perfectly structured and implemented, it does not guarantee that it will lead to improvements
in the firm riskiness, as it may provoke resistance of other board members. As corporate
governance reforms move towards increasing boards’ responsibilities for risk and
performance, it is important to consider board-wide remuneration issues without narrowing
them to the CEO’s compensation.
There is also a direct implication for the public debate on limitation of the number of
directorships held by executives from our findings.

While the National Association of

Corporate Directors (1996) put forward a threshold of three directorships, and the Council of
Institutional Investors (2003) argues that directors with full-time jobs should not participate
in more than two other boards in order to guarantee that they can give adequate service, we
argue that board effectiveness depends also on its overall level of busyness, i.e. on the
proportion of busy directors at the board level.

26

“The performance-related elements of executive remuneration… should be sensitive to pay and employment
conditions elsewhere in the group” (Supporting principle, Section D: Remuneration, The UK Corporate
Governance Code, 2010: p. 22).
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Table 1
Variable Definitions
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All data variables in this table refer to the corresponding compensation and corporate
governance variable identifiers in the BoardEx annual database and to the corresponding risk
and firm characteristics variables identifiers in the Tomson Datastream database.
Variable
Definition
Crash Risk
Tail Risk

The negative of the average return on the company’s stock over
the 5% worst return weeks for the company’s stock

Extreme Sigma

The negative of the worst deviation of firm-specific weekly
returns from the average firm-specific weekly returns divided by
the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns
𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑅_𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑇 = −𝑀𝑖𝑛 [

Negative conditional
skewness

̅ 𝑖,𝑇
𝑊𝑖,𝑡 −𝑊
𝜎𝑊𝑖,𝑇

]

The negative conditional skewness. we calculate negative
conditional skewness by taking the negative of the third central
moment of firm-specific deviations of weekly returns from the
company’s annual mean return scaled by the sample variance of
the same raised to the power of 3/2.
̅𝑖,𝑇 )3 ]/
𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝐼,𝑇 = −[𝑛(𝑛 − 1)3/2 ∑𝑛𝑇=1(𝑊𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑊
̅𝑖,𝑇 )2 )3/2 ]
[(𝑛 − 1)(𝑛 − 2)(∑𝑛𝑇=1(𝑊𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑊

Corporate Governance

CEO pay slice (CPS)

The fraction of the total compensation to the group of minimum
top-two and maximum top-five executives, including CEO that is
received by the CEO.

Board busyness

The proportion of busy directors at the board level. Busy directors
are defined as directors holding three or more directorships,
including the “home” company, in the public companies at the
same time.

Board composition

The proportion of executive directors on the board. Total number
of supervisory directors divided by the total number of all
directors on the board.

Board size

The natural logarithm of the total number of all directors on the
board.

CEO tenure

The number of years directors have served on the board

Duality

Indicator variable: equals one if CEO and Chairman is the same
person
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CEO outsider

CEO Outsider is a dummy equal to one, if CEO was working at
the firm for less than one year before becoming CEO.

Firm characteristics
Size

Natural logarithm of market value: Ln (MV)

Leverage

Total debt/total assets WC03255/ WC02999

Capital expenditures

Capital expenditures/ total assets: WC04601/ WC02999

Table 2
Calculation of CPS variables
This is an example calculation for our measures of CEO pay slice (CPS) using BoardEx
database data for the AEGIS GROUP PLC (ISIN GB00B4JV1B90) for the year 1997. Total
compensation is a total compensation including salary, bonuses, and equity-based
compensation per executive director. The Rank is an executives’ rank by total compensation.
The proportion of CEO compensation to the total compensation of total five executives
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including CEO (CPS) is the total compensation of CEO to the sum of total compensations of
top five executives..
Director
Rank
Total Compensation
1
Sir Crispin Henry Davis (CEO)
971
2
Kai Hiemstra
793
3
Eryck Rebbouh
483
4
Bruno Kemoun
476
5
Colin Richard Day
432
6
Raymond (Ray) F Kelly
341

Total Compensation of top five executives
Total CEO Compensation
CPS

3,155
971
971/3,155=0.3078

Table 3
Calculation of Board Busyness variables
This is an example calculation for our measures of director busyness using BoardEx database
data for the SAFEWAY PLC (ISIN GB0000492412) for the year 1997. Total number of
directorships counts the number of directorships (total number of current quoted boards
including the “home” company) held by all directors serving on the board. Directorships per
director are estimated as the total number of directorships held by the directors of the board
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divided by board size. Board Busyness is the number of directors holding three or more board
seats divided by board size.
Director
Total Directorships
Colin Deverell Smith
1
David Gordon Webster
3
Gordon Wotherspoon
1
Patricia (Pat) Anne O'Driscoll
1
Robert George Charters
1
Simon Timothy Laffin
1
Sir Alistair Grant
4
Doctor Neville Clifford Bain
4
Julia Ann Burdus
4
Michael John Allen
2

Total Directorships
Directorships per Director
Board busyness

22
22/10 = 2.2
4/10 = 0.4 (40%)

Table 4
Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for the sample of 692 firms for 1997- 2010 time period,
excluding financial firms. All variables are winzorized to the 1st /99th percentiles. All variable
definitions are in the Table 1.
Mean
Min
Max
Observation
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Panel A: Crash Risk
Tail risk
Negative conditional skewness
Extreme sigma

0.14
0.12
2.88

0.01
-7.15
0.37

2.24
7.18
6.97

5312
5312
5312

0.45
0.17
0.48
1.93
0.09
5.16
0.54

0.00
0.00
0.20
1.10
0.00
0.00
0.00

1.00
0.67
0.80
2.71
1.00
24.70
1.00

5038
5312
5312
5312
5312
5312
5312

4.65
0.05
0.18

-1.90
0.00
0.00

11.97
0.34
0.95

5310
5302
5311

Panel B: Compensation/Director/
Board characteristics
CPS
Board busyness
Board composition
Board size
Board duality
CEO tenure
CEO outsider
Panel C: Firm characteristics
Size
Capex/Total Assets
Leverage
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Table 5
Corporate Governance Characteristics and Stock price crash risk
This table reports results from an analysis of crash risk measured by tail risk, negative conditional skewness and
extreme sigma in our sample of 692 firms (4374 observations) for which corporate governance and financial
data are available for at least five consecutive years between 1997 and 2010. All variable definitions are in
Table 1. mi is a serial correlation test of order i using residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed as
N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Hansen J is a test of the over-identifying restrictions,
asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the instruments and the error
term. Standard errors are in parentheses beneath each coefficient estimate. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Crash Riskt-1
CEO Pay Slice (CPS)
Board busyness
Board composition
Board size
Duality
CEO tenure
CEO outsider
Size
Capex
Leverage
Constant

Tail Risk
0.1515***
(0.0064)
0.0585***
(0.0058)
0.0922***
(0.0118)
-0.0577***
(0.0158)
0.1469***
(0.0058)
-0.0019***
(0.0006)
-0.0017***
(0.0003)
-0.0019***
(0.0004)
-0.0618***
(0.0014)
0.0900***
(0.0305)
0.0565***
(0.0113)
0.1986***
(0.0187)

Neg.Cond Skewness Extreme Sigma
0.0760***
0.0547***
(0.0092)
(0.0096)
0.3576***
0.3150***
(0.1001)
(0.0826)
0.5389***
0.6166***
(0.1563)
(0.1256)
-1.1851***
-0.3803**
(0.2453)
(0.1850)
1.6762***
1.1753***
(0.0991)
(0.0834)
-0.0524***
-0.0332***
(0.0089)
(0.0078)
0.0107**
0.0156***
(0.0049)
(0.0038)
-0.0211***
-0.0215***
(0.0053)
(0.0042)
-0.4682***
1.0200***
(0.0184)
(0.0424)
1.5913***
1.1100***
(0.3893)
(0.2700)
0.6342***
0.4718***
(0.1389)
(0.1101)
-0.2751
2.3460***
(0.2854)
(0.2225)

m1

0.000

0.000

0.000

m2

0.561

0.163

0.849

Hansen J

0.149

0.208

0.270

Year dummy

Yes

Yes

Yes

Number of observations

4374

4374

4374
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Table 6
Corporate Governance and Stock Price Crashes: The effect of Industry Competition
This table reports results from an analysis of crash risk measured by tail risk, negative conditional skewness and
extreme sigma in our sample of 692 firms (4374 observations) for which corporate governance and financial
data are available for at least five consecutive years between 1997 and 2010. All variable definitions are in
Table 1. mi is a serial correlation test of order i using residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed as
N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Hansen J is a test of the over-identifying restrictions,
asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the instruments and the error
term. Standard errors are in parentheses beneath each coefficient estimate. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Tail Risk
Neg.Cond. Skewness
Extreme Sigma
Industry
competition
Information
asymmetry
Crash Riskt-1
CEO Pay Slice (CPS)
Board busyness
Board composition
Board size
Duality
CEO tenure
CEO outsider
Size
Capex
Leverage
Constant
m1
m2
Hansen J
Year dummy
Number of
observations

Low

High

Low

High

Low

High

High

Low

High

Low

High

Low

0.1782***
(0.0032)
0.0625***
(0.0041)
0.0970***
(0.0054)
0.0060
(0.0066)
0.1163***
(0.0026)
0.0019***
(0.0003)
0.0022***
(0.0001)
-0.0016***
(0.0002)
-0.0638***
(0.0007)
0.1798***
(0.0109)
0.0364***
(0.0042)
0.2479***
(0.0068)
0.000
0.539
0.882
Yes

0.0583***
(0.0035)
0.0218***
(0.0030)
0.0807***
(0.0053)
-0.0416***
(0.0050)
0.1271***
(0.0033)
-0.0042***
(0.0003)
-0.0025***
(0.0002)
-0.0014***
(0.0002)
-0.0638***
(0.0007)
0.1282***
(0.0118)
0.0752***
(0.0054)
0.2528***
(0.0086)
0.000
0.226
0.766
Yes

0.0886***
(0.0048)
0.6400***
(0.0455)
0.8334***
(0.0508)
-0.6668***
(0.1011)
1.6667***
(0.0448)
-0.0177***
(0.0035)
0.0321**
(0.0020)
-0.0319***
(0.0022)
-0.3830***
(0.0068)
0.7245***
(0.1194)
0.1733***
(0.0740)
-1.1722
(0.1120)
0.000
0.100
0.868
Yes

0.0166***
(0.0092)
0.0826
(0.0564)
0.4435***
(0.1019)
-0.1813
(0.2453)
1.6249***
(0.0618)
-0.0792***
(0.0048)
-0.0212**
(0.0033)
-0.0267***
(0.0026)
-0.4851***
(0.0112)
3.3722***
(0.1872)
0.5840***
(0.0850)
-0.3828*
(0.1966)
0.000
0.194
0.708
Yes

0.0599***
(0.0051)
0.4107***
(0.0348)
0.5200***
(0.0557)
-0.6788***
(0.0793)
1.1538***
(0.0272)
-0.0038
(0.0031)
0.0332***
(0.0018)
-0.0264***
(0.0018)
-0.3377***
(0.0065)
1.0732***
(0.0846)
0.0171***
(0.0500)
2.2268***
(0.0611)
0.000
0.376
0.866
Yes

-0.0327***
(0.00536)
0.0329***
(0.0495)
0.6478***
(0.0741)
0.1566
(0.0962)
1.1511***
(0.0561)
-0.0460***
(0.0043)
-0.0125***
(0.0024)
-0.0199***
(0.0022)
-0.4226***
(0.0092)
1.9189***
(0.1800)
0.2194***
(0.0734)
2.8838***
(0.1581)
0.000
0.256
0.602
Yes

1989

2019

1989

2019

1989

2019

Table 7
Corporate Governance and Stock Price Crashes: The effect of the Financial Crisis
2007/2008
This table reports results from an analysis of crash risk measured by tail risk, negative conditional skewness and
extreme sigma in our sample of 692 firms (4374 observations) for which corporate governance and financial
data are available for at least five consecutive years between 1997 and 2010. Crisis is a dummy variable, which
is equal to one for years 2007 and 2008, and zero otherwise. All other variable definitions are in Table 1. mi is a
serial correlation test of order i using residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the
null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Hansen J is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically
distributed as χ2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the instruments and the error term.
Standard errors are in parentheses beneath each coefficient estimate. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Tail Risk
Neg.Cond.Skewness
Extreme Sigma
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Crash Riskt-1
CEO Pay Slice
(CPS)
Crisis
CPS x Crisis
Board busyness

0.1518***
(0.0063)
0.0650***
(0.0062)
0.0316***
(0.0068)
-0.0385***
(0.0130)
0.0834***
(0.0054)

0.1532***
(0.0063)
0.0568***
(0.0063)
0.0532***
(0.0039)

-0.0710
(0.0145)
0.1474***
(0.0058)
-0.0018***
(0.0006)
-0.0019***
(0.0003)
-0.0019***
(0.0004)
-0.0614***
(0.0058)
0.0815***
(0.0303)
0.0615***
(0.0115)
0.2027***
(0.0180)

0.1592***
(0.0107)
0.0091
(0.0126)
-0.0654***
(0.0142)
0.1453***
(0.0059)
-0.0016***
(0.0006)
-0.0021***
(0.0003)
-0.0016***
(0.0004)
-0.0602***
(0.0014)
0.0814***
(0.0304)
0.0577***
(0.0110)
0.1767***
(0.0172)

m1
m2
Hansen J
Year dummy

0.000
0.568
0.151
Yes

Number of
observations

4374

Board Busyness x
Crisis
Board composition
Board size
Duality
CEO tenure
CEO outsider
Size
Capex
Leverage
Constant

0.0753***
(0.0092)
0.4651***
(0.1024)
0.1034
(0.1288)
-0.1770
(0.2558)
0.5638***
(0.1570)

0.0729***
(0.0088)
0.3634***
(0.0973)
0.1182*
(0.0653)

0.0553***
(0.0094)
0.4003***
(0.1006)
0.1508
(0.0966)
0.1766
(0.1955)
0.6401***
(0.1323)

0.0579***
(0.0536)
0.3323***
(0.0851)
0.0170
(0.0517)

-1.2638***
(0.2410)
1.6700***
(0.0964)
-0.0527***
(0.0089)
0.0107**
(0.0048)
-0.0206***
(0.0052)
-0.4674***
(0.0183)
1.5624***
(0.3883)
0.6429***
(0.1406)
-0.2744
(0.2764)

1.2173***
(0.1207)
-0.4796*
(0.2574)
-1.2055***
(0.2257)
1.7064***
(0.0965)
-0.0439***
(0.0085)
0.0097**
(0.0048)
-0.0202***
(0.0052)
-0.4737***
(0.0151)
1.8559***
(0.3348)
0.4965***
(0.1476)
-0.4972*
(0.2854)

-0.4636
(0.1879)
1.1864***
(0.0739)
-0.0309
(0.0077)
0.0158***
(0.0037)
-0.0220***
(0.0041)
-0.3927***
(0.0077)
1.1087***
(0.2718)
0.0503***
(0.1292)
2.3411***
(0.2274)

0.9006***
(0.1127)
-0.3373**
(0.1843)
-0.3428*
(0.1956)
1.1648***
(0.0759)
-0.0290***
(0.0074)
0.0149***
(0.0038)
-0.0216***
(0.0041)
-0.4226***
(0.0092)
1.1770***
(0.2544)
0.4555***
(0.1306)
2.1834***
(0.2189)

0.000
0.519
0.100
Yes

0.000
0.161
0.208
Yes

0.000
0.194
0.708
Yes

0.000
0.817
0.278
Yes

0.000
0.856
0.311
Yes

4374

4374

4374

4374

4374
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